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Abstract. We examine individual behavior in generalized games of matching pennies. Our
¯ndings are twofold. First, individuals cooperate in these games; i.e., they systematically
select strategies that lead both players to obtain higher expected payo®s than Nash. Second,
among the main models in the extant literature (some of which were explicitly designed to
induce cooperative behavior) the only one that predicts the observed behavior is the quantal
response equilibrium.
1. Introduction
In this paper we examine experimental behavior in `generalized games of matching pen-
nies,' a class of two-by-two games with no pure strategy Nash equilibria described in Figure 2.
Prior work has shown that the quantal response model ¯ts the data better than Nash equi-
librium or noisy Nash equilibrium [5], [7], [3], [4]. The existing papers have emphasized
that the quantal response model is to be preferred because it models individuals as being
boundedly rational. In this paper we discuss a di®erent property of the quantal response
model: it is the only existing model that leads to cooperative behavior and outcomes in the
generalized game of matching pennies.
In section 2 we summarize the experimental ¯ndings for the generalized game of matching
pennies. In section 3 we describe the quantal response equilibrium and show that its com-
parative statics are consistent with the experimental ¯ndings. We then discuss other models
in section 4 and show how they all lead to predictions inconsistent with the experimental
results. The Appendix contains all proofs.
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Figure 1. Generalized game of matching pennies, where a > 0.
2. Stylized facts
In the unique Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric game of matching pennies, Row selects u
with probability p = 1=2 and Column selects L with probability q = 1=(1 + a). In particular,
the parameter a (`the own payo®') does not a®ect the equilibrium mixed strategy of Row.
The experimental evidence summarized in Table 1 contradicts this prediction. Column pA
denotes the frequency with which Row players selected action u. For each of the three sets
of experiments (i.e., Goeree and Holt [3], Ochs [7] and McKelvey et al. [6]) pA is increasing
in its own payo® a.
Table 1 provides further evidence against the predictions of the Nash equilibrium. Column
¼R is the expected payo® for Row given that the players select Nash equilibrium strategies.
Column ¼A
R is the expected payo® for Row given the actual strategies selected by the players.
It can be seen that when a 6= 1 players select strategies that lead to higher expected payo®s
for the Row player than Nash. Similarly, Column player also obtains higher expected payo®s
than Nash. For the experiment with a = 7, Row obtains 27% more than the Nash expected
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3Thus, the experimental evidence strongly points to individuals cooperating. These results
may not appear that surprising given the extensive evidence of altruistic behavior observed
in games (Fehr and Schmidt [2] and Charness and Rabin [1]). For this reason, these authors
have developed game-theoretic equilibrium concepts that account for altruism ([8], [2], [1]).
What we ¯nd surprising is that these models do not predict cooperative behavior in the
generalized game of matching pennies, and thus are inconsistent with our stylized facts.
We consider ¯rst a model of boundedly rational players { the quantal response equilib-
rium { whose comparative statics is consistent with the experimental results. It is already
known that the quantal response equilibrium `¯ts' experimental data better than the Nash
equilibrium [5]. However, it has not been pointed out before that, for the generalized game
of matching pennies, the quantal response equilibrium predicts that individuals act cooper-
atively.
3. The quantal response equilibrium
Consider a two-player game in normal form (S1;S2;¼1;¼2), where for i = 1;2, Si is the
¯nite set of actions for player i, and ¼i(si;sj) is the payo® for player i when she selects
action si 2 Si and player j selects action sj 2 Sj. Let ¢(Si) denote the set of probability
distributions (that is, mixed strategies) of player i. For each mixed strategy ¾i 2 ¢(Si)
and each action si 2 Si, ¾i (si) ¸ 0 denotes the probability that player i will select the
action si 2 Si in that mixed strategy. Naturally,
P
si2Si ¾i (si) = 1. With slight abuse of
notation si also denotes the degenerate mixed strategy for which the action si is selected with




sj2Sj ¼(si;sj)¾i(si)¾j(sj) to be the expected
payo® for player i when choosing her action according to the mixed strategy ¾i given that
player j is selecting her actions according to the mixed strategy ¾j.
McKelvey and Palfrey [5] formulate a theory in which players choose their actions based
on relative expected utilities and assume other players do so as well. McKelvey and Palfrey's
motivate such behavior as arising from players choosing their strategies with error (embody-
ing a form of `bounded rationality'). The quantal response equilibrium is then obtained as
4the ¯xed point of this process. For a logit speci¯cation of the error structure they derived
the following expressions for the quantal response function and associated equilibrium.
De¯nition Fix ¸ ¸ 0. The logistic quantal response function of player i to the mixed




^ si2Si e¸ui(^ sij¾j):




















When ¸ = 0, a player selects each action with equal probability. In the limit as ¸ ! 1,
the probability the player selects the action with the highest payo® tends to one, and the
equilibrium converges to Nash. Hence, the parameter ¸ may be interpreted as the degree of
rationality of the player, where larger values of ¸ correspond to individuals who are more
rational (or more strictly speaking, more likely to select a best response). Of course, higher
rationality by all players does not lead to higher payo®s as is shown below.
Proposition 1 below states that the logit equilibrium is consistent with the stylized facts
discussed in the Section 2.
Proposition 1. For all ¸ > 0, in the logit equilibrium, p is increasing in a, while q is
decreasing in a. Furthermore, for all a > 0, a 6= 1 both players obtain higher expected payo®s
than in the Nash equilibrium.
A formal proof appears in the appendix, but to provide some intuition let us start with
a = 1, that is, the standard symmetric matching pennies. The logit equilibrium is the same
as the Nash with p = q = 1=2, since for each player, given her opponent's behavior, each of
the two available actions yields the same expected payo®, namely 1=2 . If a were increased
and Column's behavior remained unchanged, then the payo® to Row of playing u would be
greater than that from playing d and so the logistic quantal response would entail a mixed
strategy in which Row plays u with a probability p > 1=2 (but unlike the Nash best response,
still less than 1). If Row were playing u with a probability p > 1=2, however, Column's
5expected payo® from selecting R would now be higher than from selecting L, and in turn
her logistic quantal response would entail a mixed strategy with q < 1=2 (but again unlike
a Nash response, still greater than 0). Although this change in Column's mixed strategy
reduces the expected payo® of Row playing u versus d, the algebra in the proof establishes
that q > 1=(1 + a) which in turn means that this strategic response of Column does not fully
o®set the direct e®ect on Row's payo® from the original increase in a. Furthermore, since
in the new logit equilibrium p > 1=2 and 1=(1 + a) < q < 1=2, it readily follows that the
expected payo®s to Row and Column are greater than what they would receive were they
playing Nash. By an analogous argument it can readily be shown that were a to be reduced
below one, in the new logit equilibrium we would have p < 1=2 and 1=(1 + a) > q > 1=2,
with expected payo®s to both higher than their respective Nash equilibrium payo®s.
The direct e®ect of moving a away from one is to induce Row to select one of his actions
with a higher probability than the other. By being `less random' in his action choice (notice
the entropy of his quantal best response has fallen), Row has conferred a bene¯t on Column.
Column `cooperates' by not fully exploiting this opportunity. That is, her quantal response
induces her to place more weight on her now preferred action but unlike a best response,
the error structure in her action choice leads Row to expect her to choose the action which
bene¯ts Row with su±ciently high probability to have Row's quantal response still involve
an unequal weighting in choosing between u and d.
In a Nash equilibrium, the parameter a does not a®ect the likelihood with which the
row player selects a, and thus the column player's payo®s do not change with a. Hence
the bounded rationality of the players stemming from the possible errors they may make
in choosing an action and their awareness that their opponents may make similar mistakes
leads to a logit equilibrium of the asymmetric matching pennies game in which both players
choose mixed strategies that are more cooperative than if they were both playing Nash with
an attendant outcome in which both players have a higher expected payo® than if they were
playing a Nash equilibrium.
64. Alternative theories
4.1. Fairness. Individuals may cooperate if their utility function depend not only on the
payo® of the game but also on the kindness and the perceived kindness of others. These
ideas are formalized in Rabin [8] and described below. For each ¾j 2 ¢(Sj), let
¦(¾j) ´ f(¼i (¾i;¾j);¼j (¾j;¾i)) : ¾i 2 ¢(Si)g,
that is, ¦(¾j) is the set of pair of payo®s for both players attainable by player i when
player j is choosing ¾j 2 ¢(Sj). Let ¼h
j (¾j) (respectively, ¼`
j (¾j)) denote player j's highest














j (¾j) be the worst possible payo® for player j in the set ¦(¾j).
De¯nition Suppose player i selects action si 2 Si and believes that player j selects the









j (¾j) if ¼h
j (¾j) > ¼min
j (¾j);
0 otherwise:
De¯nition Player i's belief about how kind player j is being to him given his belief that
player j is playing the mixed strategy ¾j 2 ¢(Sj) and his belief that player j believes player
i is choosing the mixed strategy ¾i 2 Si, is given by
~ fj (¾j;¾i) =
¼i (¾i;¾j) ¡ ¼e
i (¾i)
¼h




i (¾i) > ¼min
i (¾i), and zero otherwise.
Following Rabin [8], in order to incorporate `fairness' into the payo®s, we assume an
individual maximizes a convex combination of his material payo® and his expectation of
the product of his belief about how kind player j is being to him and his kindness to player
7j plus one. That is, suppose player i believes that player j is playing the mixed strategy
¾j 2 ¢(Sj) and furthermore i believes that j believes that i is playing the mixed strategy
¾i 2 ¢(Si), then i's expected payo® from playing the pure strategy si is given by
Ui (si;¾j;¾i) = (1 ¡ ®)¼i (si;¾j) + ® ~ fj (¾j;¾i)[1 + fi (si;¾j)];







is a fairness equilibrium if for i = 1;2, j 6= i,
¾
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2[(1 ¡ ®)a + 1]
¶
.






2[(1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) ¡ ®]
¶
is also a fairness equilibrium.
This result contradicts the experimental evidence presented in Table 1 that shows that p
is increasing in a. Instead, Row mixes in the fairness equilibrium the same as if the players
selected strategies according to the Nash equilibrium. To see why, notice that for Column
to play a mixed strategy in equilibrium requires Row's mixed strategy to induce the same
payo® to Column from either of her actions L or R. That is, UC (L;p;q) = UC (R;p;q), or
equivalently,
(1 ¡ ®)[¼C (L;p) ¡ ¼C (R;p)] + ® ~ fR (p;q)[fC (L;p) ¡ fC (R;p)] = 0:
We know from the Nash equilibrium that ¼C (L;1=2) = ¼C (R;1=2). But it is also straight-
forward to show that ~ fR (1=2;q) = 0 for all q, since ¼C (q;1=2) = 1=2 = ¼e
C (q). That is,
8if Column believes Row is choosing each of his actions with equal probability, she believes
Row is being neither `kind' nor `unkind' since such a mixing by Row guarantees Column
an expected material payo® equal to the `equitable' material payo® of 1=2 no matter what
Column chooses.
Analogously, we know that for Row to play a mixed strategy in equilibrium requires
Column's mixed strategy to induce the same payo® to Row from either of his actions u or
d. That is, UR (u;q;p) = UR (d;q;p). Or equivalently,
(1 ¡ ®)[¼R (u;q) ¡ ¼C (d;q)] + ® ~ fC (q;p)[fR (u;q) ¡ fR (d;q)] = 0:
Again we know from the Nash equilibrium that ¼R (u;1=(1 + a)) = ¼R (d;1=(1 + a)). But




























That is, with a > 1, at the Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric game (p = 1=2;q = 1=(1 + a)),
the `fair-minded' Row player gets a higher payo® from playing d to playing u. Column's fair-
ness equilibrium strategy thus entails her playing L with a higher probability than she would











it immediately follows that both Row and Column enjoy higher expected material payo®s
in the fairness equilibrium than they would in the Nash equilibrium. Similarly with a < 1,
Column plays L with a lower probability than she would if Row had standard preferences,
and again the expected material payo®s are higher in the fairness equilibrium than in the
Nash equilibrium.
4.2. Social preferences. An alternative approach to `fairness' is to assume a player has a
direct regard for other players' material payo® as well as her own. We shall say an individual
1Rather, we have ~ fC (1=2;p) = 0, for all p, since ¼R (p;1=2) = (ap + 1 ¡ p)=2 = ¼e
R (p).
9has social preferences (see Charness and Rabin [1]) if the utility for individual i when player




























1 if xi < xj
0 otherwise:
I.e., we have
ui(xi;xj) = xi + r(xi;xj)½(xj ¡ xi) + s(xi;xj)¿ (xj ¡ xi)
= xi ¡ ½max(0;xi ¡ xj) + ¿ max(0;xj ¡ xi):
De¯nition A social-welfare equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the game with preferences
(UR;UC).
This model was ¯rst considered by Fehr and Schmidt [2] with the additional restriction
that ½ · ¡¿ and 0 · ½ · 1. Charness and Rabin label preferences depending on the
parameters values as follows:
² Competitive preferences correspond to ¿ · ½ · 0.
² Di®erence aversion preferences corresponds to ¿ < 0 < ½ < 1.
² Social-welfare preferences corresponds to 1 ¸ ½ ¸ ¿ > 0
They interpret their experimental evidence as supporting the social-welfare preferences.
However, as shown in Proposition 3, none of the preferences considered in [1] are consistent
with the experimental evidence in the generalized game of matching pennies.
Proposition 3. The experimental results that for all a 6= 1 individuals obtain higher expected
payo®s than Nash is inconsistent with the social-welfare equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is the following. With social preferences, the game can be
rewritten as described in Figure 2. In order for the game to maintain the mixed strategy


















Figure 2. Generalized game of matching pennies, where a > 0.
dR), while column players prefer outcomes on the o® diagonal (uR, dL). This requires that
for all a, ¿a < 1¡½ and a(1¡½) > ¿. In order for these inequalities to hold for a arbitrarily
close to 1, ¿ = 1¡½. However, if ¿ = 1¡½, the game has no mixed strategy equilibria when
a 6= 1.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown a surprising property of the generalized game of matching
pennies. Equilibrium concepts that attempt to model cooperative behavior do not predict
that individuals would be able to cooperate in this game. However, a model for how indi-
viduals select actions with errors predicts that individuals cooperate. Further, experimental
results are consistent with this prediction.
We have de¯ned cooperative behavior as the players choosing mixed strategies that di®er
from what they would have chosen if they had been playing Nash and leads to both players
obtaining payo®s that are higher than Nash. Clearly, the quantal response equilibrium does
not have this property for all games. For instance, consider a game that has a unique Nash
equilibrium which is Pareto e±cient. Then, any equilibrium model in which players do not
always select the best response leads to payo® that are lower than Nash. What this suggests,
however, is that part of the success of the quantal response equilibrium in analyzing the game
of matching pennies may be due to the fact that for this class of games it corresponds to
cooperative behavior.
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12Appendix
Remark In order to describe the experiments in Goeree and Holt as generalized matching
pennies games, we subtracted 40 from each player's payo® of 40 and then divided all payo®s
by 40. Subtracting a constant from all cells does not change the quantal response, the
fairness, or the social welfare equilibrium. Multiplying the payo®s by a constant changes
the values of ¸ in the quantal response equilibrium, and the values of ½ and ¿ in the social-
welfare equilibrium. This is a reason for why comparisons should be made within di®erent
treatments of the same experiment (i.e., Goeree and Holt (AM) and Goeree and Holt (RS))
and not across experiments
Lemma 1. When a > 1, both players obtain a payo® higher than Nash if and only if p > 1=2
and q 2 ( 1
1+a;1=2); when a < 1, both players obtain a payo® higher than Nash if and only if
p < 1=2 and q 2 (1=2; 1
1+a).
Proof. (i) If q = 1
a+1, the Row's payo®s remain the same. (ii) If q > 1
a+1, the payo® for
action u increases, while the payo® for action d decreases. Therefore, in order for Row's
payo®s to increase, requires p > 1=2. The expected payo® for the column player is equal
to p(1 ¡ q) + (1 ¡ p)q. Given that p > 1=2, in order for this expression to be greater than
one-half, (1 ¡ q) > 1=2 or q < 1=2. This is only possible if a > 1. (iii) If q < 1
a+1, the payo®
for action u decreases, while the payo® for action d increases. Therefore, in order for Row's
payo®s to increase, requires p < 1=2. The expected payo® for the column player is equal
to p(1 ¡ q) + (1 ¡ p)q. Given that p < 1=2, in order for this expression to be greater than
one-half, requires q > 1=2. This is only possible if a < 1. ¤
Proposition 1. For all ¸ > 0, in the quantal response equilibrium, p is increasing in a, q is
decreasing in a, and both players obtain higher expected payo®s than in the Nash equilibrium.
13Proof. The payo®s are rewritten as u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1, and u(a) = ®. Let
f(p;q;®;¸) =
e¸®q
e¸®q + e¸(1¡q) ¡ p
g(p;q;®;¸) =
e¸(1¡p)
e¸(1¡p) + e¸p ¡ q:
Then, a quantal response equilibrium (pL;qL) satis¯es
f(p
L;q
L;®;¸) = 0; g(p
L;q
L;®;¸) = 0:

























where fp = gq = ¡1, g® = 0,
fq =












(e¸(1¡p) + e¸p)2 < 0
f® =




































Notice that when a = 1, ® = 1, pL(1) = qL(1) = 1
®+1 = 1




(1+®)2. Therefore, for all a > 1, qL > 1
1+®. Since p® > 0 and q® < 0, it follows
that for a > 1, pL > 1=2 and qL 2 ( 1
1+a;1=2). Therefore, by Lemma 1 both players obtain a
higher payo® than Nash. The same argument is used for the case when a < 1. ¤






2[(1 ¡ ®)a + 1]
¶
.






2[(1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) ¡ ®]
¶
is also a fairness equilibrium.






Row p max(ap;1 ¡ p) min(ap;1 ¡ p) (ap ¡ p + 1)=2
Column q max(q;1 ¡ q) min(q;1 ¡ q) 1=2
.
Plugging these values into the de¯nition of fi (¢;¢) we calculate:
fR (u;q) =
¼C (q;u) ¡ ¼e
C (q)
¼h
C (q) ¡ ¼min
C (q)
=




> > > <
> > > :
1=2 if q < 1=2
0 if q = 1=2
¡1=2 if q > 1=2
;
fR (d;q) =
¼C (q;d) ¡ ¼e
C (q)
¼h







> > > <
> > > :
¡1=2 if q < 1=2
0 if q = 1=2
1=2 if q > 1=2
;
fC (L;p) =
¼R (p;L) ¡ ¼e
R (p)
¼h
R (p) ¡ ¼min
R (p)
=
ap ¡ (ap ¡ p + 1)=2
jap + p ¡ 1j
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
¡1=2 if p < 1
a+1
0 if p = 1
a+1




¼R (p;R) ¡ ¼e
R (p)
¼h
R (p) ¡ ¼min
R (p)
=
(1 ¡ p) ¡ (ap ¡ p + 1)=2
jap + p ¡ 1j
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
1=2 if p < 1
a+1
0 if p = 1
a+1
¡1=2 if p > 1
a+1
.
16And plugging these values into the de¯nition of ~ fi (¢;¢) yields:
~ fC (q;p) =
paq + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ q) ¡ (ap ¡ p + 1)=2
jap + p ¡ 1j
=
(pa ¡ 1 + p)(q ¡ 1=2)
jap + p ¡ 1j
=
8
> > > <
> > > :
1=2 ¡ q if p < 1=(1 + a)
0 if p = 1=(1 + a)
q ¡ 1=2 if p > 1=(1 + a)
,
~ fR (p;q) =
p(1 ¡ q) + (1 ¡ p)q ¡ 1=2
j1 ¡ 2qj
=




> > > <
> > > :
p ¡ 1=2 if q < 1=2
0 if q = 1=2
1=2 ¡ p if q > 1=2
.
Thus (p;q) 2 (0;1)
2 is an equilibrium if
Row : UR (u;q;p) ¡ UR (d;q;p) = 0 (1)
Column : UC (L;p;q) ¡ UC (R;p;q) = 0 (2)
Equation (1) may be reexpressed
(3) (1 ¡ ®)[¼R (u;q) ¡ ¼R (d;q)] + ® ~ fC (q;p)[fR (u;q) ¡ fR (d;q)] = 0
and equation (2) becomes
(4) (1 ¡ ®)[¼C (L;p) ¡ ¼C (R;p)] + ® ~ fR (p;q)[fC (L;p) ¡ fC (R;p)] = 0
Assuming p > 1=(1 + a), then we have by plugging in the appropriate values into (4):
Column :
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ 2p) + ®(p ¡ 1=2) = 0 if q < 1=2
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ 2p) ¡ ®(p ¡ 1=2) = 0 if q > 1=2
17But the only solution is p = 1=2. If instead we assume p < 1=(1 + a) we have
Column :
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ 2p) ¡ ®(p ¡ 1=2) = 0 if q < 1=2
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ 2p) + ®(p ¡ 1=2) = 0 if q > 1=2
and again, the only solution is p = 1=2.
So ¯x p = 1=2. Now consider a > 1. Since p > 1=(1 + a) equation (1) becomes
Row :
(1 ¡ ®)(qa ¡ 1 + q) + ®(q ¡ 1=2) = 0 if q < 1=2
(1 ¡ ®)(qa ¡ 1 + q) ¡ ®(q ¡ 1=2) = 0 if q > 1=2
Which yields for q < 1=2 the solution
q =
1 ¡ ® + 1





And for q > 1=2 the solution is
q =
2 ¡ 3®
2[(1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) ¡ ®]
.
Now for this value to be greater than 1=2 requires
2 ¡ 3® > (1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) ¡ ® > 0
or 3® ¡ 2 > a ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) > 0
.
But
2 ¡ 3® > (1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) ¡ ®
, (a ¡ 1)® > (a ¡ 1) , ® > 1,
a contradiction. Hence
3® ¡ 2 > a ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) , ® < 1,
18and, so when a > 1, we require
a ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) > 0 , (2 + a)® > (1 + a).
It remains to consider the case of a < 1. Since p < 1=(1 + a) equation (1) becomes
Row :
(1 ¡ ®)(qa ¡ 1 + q) + ®(1=2 ¡ q) = 0 if q < 1=2
(1 ¡ ®)(qa ¡ 1 + q) ¡ ®(1=2 ¡ q) = 0 if q > 1=2
Which yields for q < 1=2 the solution
q =
2 ¡ 3®
2[(1 ¡ ®)(1 + a) ¡ ®]
which is indeed in the open interval (0;1=2) if ® < (1 + a)=(2 + a). For q > 1=2 we have
q =
2 ¡ ®
2[(1 ¡ ®)a + 1]
> 1=2.
¤
Proposition 3. In a social-welfare equilibrium, for some a 6= 1=2, one of the players obtains
a payo® that is lower or equal to the Nash payo®.
Proof. Consider the case a > 1. In order for both players to obtain a payo® higher than
Nash, p > 1=2 and q 2 ( 1
1+a;1=2). Thus, there are two possible equilibria: both players mix,
and only the column player mixes.
First suppose that in equilibrium all actions are selected with positive probability. In a
mixed strategy equilibrium the expected payo® for Row of u is the same as the expected
payo® of d. This means that
q(a ¡ ½a) + (1 ¡ q)¿ = q¿ + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ½),
or
q =
1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ½
1 + a ¡ 2¿ ¡ ½ ¡ a½
=
(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ½)
(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ½) + (a ¡ ¿ ¡ a½)
.
19Similarly, the expected payo® of Column for L is the same as the expected payo® for R:
p(¿a) + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ ½) = p(1 ¡ ½) + (1 ¡ p)¿,
or
p =
1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ½
2 ¡ ¿ ¡ a¿ ¡ 2½
=
1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ½
(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ½) + (1 ¡ a¿ ¡ ½)
In order for p > 1=2, ¿ >
1¡½
a . In order for q < 1=2, a(1 ¡ ½) > ¿. In order for both of
these inequalities to hold for all a, ¿ = 1 ¡ ½. This implies that q = 0 which contradicts our
assumption that all actions are played with positive probability.
Second, suppose the row player selects u and column player mixes. Then, the expected
payo® of Column for L is the same as the expected payo® for R:
¿a = 1 ¡ ½,
which can hold for at most one value of a. ¤
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